Philosophy 7 is an introduction to the Philosophy of Mind.   All quarter we'll be thinking about a single profound and puzzling question: how does the mind emerge from the physical world?  In Unit 1: The Mind in Nature, we will examine the question of how and whether the mind can interact with the natural environment.  In Unit 2: The Mechanical Mind, we'll evaluate the hypothesis that the mind is a kind of computer--  a biological, information processing machine.  And in Unit 3: Consciousness we'll investigate the rich sense of "awareness" associated with subjective conscious experience, and ask whether consciousness can be understood within the limits of cognitive science.  Readings will be drawn from the fields of philosophy, computer science, and cognitive science, starting from Descartes up through contemporary debates.
TAs:​
  • Lavi Echeverria
  • William Fraker
  • Seungtaek Lee
  • Savannah Leon
  • Jon (Xudong) Ma
  • Birch (Ziyan) Yang​
GG Extra Office Hours
  • Monday Nov 10: 2-3 pm on Zoom (link here)
  • Wednesday Nov 12: 3:30-5:30 (Luvalle)
Exam 2 prep materials
Exam Advice from the TAs!
  • FOLLOW DIRECTIONS : Read the questions carefully and do what the instructions describe. If the question asks for one objection and reply , only address one objection and reply. You won’t gain points by describing more arguments in less detail.
  • Clarify your terms : Don’t take the reader’s understanding for granted. Your arguments and explanations should be self-contained and not require the reader to add or insert extra information. For key terms like “mental representation”, “cognition”, “symbol”, “computation”, etc. — say what you mean by these. Don’t just repeat the definition. You might explain them in your own words, use an illustrative example, or both.
  • Anchor your examples : Don’t describe your examples in a vacuum. Always make sure to position your examples in the broader philosophical point you’re making. A useful rule of thumb: state the philosophical point. Describe an example that illustrates the point. And then re-summarize the point in light of the example.
  • Providing evaluation. When prompted to evaluate a position and give your reasons, it isn’t enough to (a) just state your evaluation, or (b) point to existence of reasons without explicitly stating them. For example, don’t say: “I reject interactionist dualism because it is not supported by science.” Do say: “I reject interactionist because dualism because it conflicts with the causal completeness of physics, and there is increasing evidence for physics being complete, and no known counter-examples.” Be sure to distinguish merely holding a view from justifying your view with reasons.
  • Capturing each components of complex notion. When explaining a complex concept, make sure to identify each component, and explain each component individually, as well as the whole complex concept. For example, if you are explaining “cognition”, you’ll have to explain “rational transitions” and “mental representations”. Each of these are complex concepts themselves, so you’ll want to explain “rational”, “transition”, and also “mental state” and “content” or “aboutness”. At every step, you may want to introduce examples to help illustrate the key concepts.
Exam 1 prep materials

Syllabus

The syllabus is subject to revision. Please check back every week.

Unit 1: The Mind in Nature

0 Soul, Mind, and Brain
Thursday Sept. 25
Read: ​Syllabus (this page) and Course Policies.
Recommended: ​The Pink Guide to Philosophy
1.1 Mind vs Body
Tuesday Sept. 30
Read: "Floating man", Ibn Sina (1027)
Read:  "On the distinction of mind and body" ,  Descartes (1641)
Reading guide
The short passage from Ibn Sina poses the question: if you came into existence without any perception or contact with the outside world, or without your body, what could you know?   His answer, roughly, is that you could still know that you had a "self" or "soul" (for our purposes, a "mind").  From this he concludes that the soul must be distinct from the body.  Even though the text is old, the argument Ibn Sina makes here still has force today.  Read it very carefully, and understand the argument.

The longer reading from Descartes is one of the most famous passages in Western Philosophy.  This text is very difficult.  Even though it is only 6 pages, leave several hours to read this, and read it completely at least twice.  You'll want to make sure you understand what Descartes is saying at every stage.

Descartes sets himself the task of trying to doubt everything that he thinks he knows.  The only beliefs left will be the absolutely certain truths.   His first move is to imagine that his entire waking life is actually an illusion creating by a deceiving demon (think of the Truman Show or the Matrix).   After doubting the existence of the external world, he turns his attention to his own mind.   Can you doubt the existence of your own mind?    After pondering this question he points out that at least he can be certain of this: the mind and the body are not the same thing.  He offers several different arguments for this conclusion, and we'll discuss these in class.  (Note: Descartes uses the terms "soul” and "mind” pretty much interchangeably.)

As you read, try to answer the following questions:
  • the original argument: Ibn Sina argues from a certain "thought experiment" to the conclusion that the soul is not the body.   What is his argument?
  • soul/mind:  what does Descartes think the essence of the soul is?  What properties distinguish it from the body?
  • body: what does Descartes think the essence of the body is?  What properties distinguish it from the soul?
  • "what am I?”:  Descartes asks this question repeatedly.  What answers does he consider?  What does he conclude? Would Ibn Sina agree?
  • soul ≠ body:  Descartes thinks the mind/soul is not the body.  But why?  He has at least three arguments-- one having to do with doubt, one having to do with the essence of soul vs body, and one having to do with divisibility.  What are these arguments?  Which is closest to Ibn Sina's?
1.2 Interactionist Dualism
Thursday Oct. 2
Required: First Survey on Philosophical Views
Read: "The Passions of the Soul" Descartes (1649) ---  [selections]
  • Note! Descartes' use of the words "passions" and "spirits" is very different from the contemporary meanings!  Check the reading guide below before starting!
Reading guide
In this selection, Descartes is explaining his overall view about how the soul, body, and brain interact.   

Terminology: for Descartes, a "passion" is merely a perception (like seeing, hearing, or tasting)--- nothing romantic.  And "animal spirits" were Descartes' best guess about what we now call the nervous system.  They were supposed to be a very thin liquid, traveling in the bloodstream, which communicate signals between the brain and the rest of the body--- they are entirely physical, nothing to do with "spirits" or spirituality. 
​
As you read, focus on understanding this big picture, and don't worry about the fussy details.   For example, don't bother trying to figure out exactly how the heart, blood, or muscles work, according to Descartes.  On the other hand, do pay attention to Descartes' views about...
​
  • the soul --- what sort of thing is it?  what does it to do?  can it affect the body?  can it be affected by the body?
  • the interaction between soul and body --- given that the soul is non-physical, and the body is physical, how do they interact? as you'll see, Descartes thinks the brain is pretty important here, but how and why? what about, for example, the heart?
  • the machine view of the body --- Descartes repeatedly compares the body to a machine; why? what is this supposed to illustrate?  in what sense is the body mechanical?  what is the difference between a living and dead body?
  • the distinction between soul and body --- what reasons does Descartes have for attributing some abilities (e.g. thinking) to the soul and others (e.g. moving) to the body?  what justification does he have for dividing things up this way?  why not the other way around?
2.1 Mental Causation
Tuesday Oct. 7
Read: ​"Princess Elisabeth against Descartes", Kim (2011)
Read: Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth and Descartes  (1643)
Reading guide
In these letters, Princess Elisabeth and Descartes debate the claims, made by Descartes, that (a) the soul is immaterial; (b) the soul and body causally interact. Elisabeth is skeptical and Descartes tries to answer her skepticism.  (The first reading is a short overview of the debate; the second reading is the actual correspondence.)   As you read the correspondence, consider...
​
  • the objection -- what is Elisabeth skeptical objection?  what part of Descartes theory does she find puzzling?  why?
  • the reply -- what is Descartes' (overall) reply to Elisabeth's question?  has he really given an answer?
  • the union of soul and body -- what is the role of this concept in the debate? does Descartes believe such a union exists?
  • extension -- in what context does this idea come up?  is matter extended?  what about the soul?
2.2 Free Will
Thursday Oct. 9
Read: "Free will and determinism",  Sider (2005)
Reading guide
This article discusses the problem of free will: can people have free will even if some form of determinism is true?   The central theme of the article is three basic approaches to free will.  According to libertarianism, free will is incompatible with determinism, and can only be explained through interactionist dualism.  According to compatibilism, free will is compatible with both dualism and physicalism.  And according to hard determinism, there simply is no such thing as free will.
​
  • determinism -- what is the doctrine of determinism? 
  • free will -- what is meant by "free will"?   do acts of free will have causes ? can free will and determinism both be true?
  • randomness --- what is the role of randomness in this discussion?  what is the difference between a random decision a free one?
  •  views-- what are the various views here-- libertarianism, hard determinism, compatibilism,-- what does each say?
  • dualism and physicalism -- which of the views are compatible with physicalism? dualism? interactionist dualism?
3.1 Causal Closure of Physics
Tuesday Oct. 14
Read: "Arguments Against Dualism", Papineau and Selina (2000)
Read:  "An Argument from Mental Causation", Kim (2011)
Optional: "Difficulties for the Dualist", Smith and Jones (1986)
Reading guide
These two readings describe an argument for physicalism (aka "materialism") based on the idea of the causal completeness of physics. (Kim calls this "the causal closure of the physicalism".)   The argument claims that causal completeness, when combined with downward causation, implies physicalism. 

The Papineau and Selina reading gives an overview of the argument, then describes an alternative response: a non-interactionist form dualism known as "epiphenomenalism."  (Focus on the core argument; don't worry about the historical asides or the stuff on quantum mechanics.)    The Kim reading zooms in on the argument itself; after you've read it, go back and look at the two key premises on p. 111 and p.112, and see if you can reconstruct how they lead to the conclusion on p. 113.

  • Causal Completeness (or Closure) of Physics -- what exactly is this principle?  how is it described?  can you put it in your own words?  What does it rule out?
  • evidence -- what kind of evidence is there for the Completeness Principle? should we expect it to hold true within the brain?
  • the argument for physicalism  -- what is the argument for physicalism, and against interactionist dualism? what assumptions does it make?  what is the role of the Causal Closure principle within this argument?
  • downward causation --- what role does downward causation play in the argument for physicalism?
  • ephiphenomenalism  -- what is epiphenomenalism?  what does it say about mental causation? what factors would motivate you to adopt this position? (hint: something to do with Causal Completeness)  what are the problems with this position?
3.2 ESSAY EXAM #1 (IN-CLASS): Mind-Body Interaction
Thursday Oct. 16
​
No quiz.
Exam 1 prep materials

Unit 2: The Mechanical Mind

4.1 Mind-Brain Connections
Tuesday Oct. 21
No quiz due to internet outage.
Read: "The Emerging Landscape", Carter (1998)
Listen: Interview with Patricia Churchland
Watch: "Brain Story: All in the Mind", BBC Documentary (2000):
  • Warning! This documentary includes some intense imagery, including footage of live brain surgery, patients with amputated limbs, and people with severe brain damage.   If you don't want to watch the video, please get in touch with me and I'll find you an alternative assignment.
Reading Guide
The article "The Emerging Landscape" is a short overview of contemporary brain science that focuses on the idea that various mental abilities correspond to specific regions of the brain.  This is a phenomenon known as "functional localization"--- in other words, mental functions have locations in the brain.  It is one of the signature discoveries of modern neuroscience

  • mental functions and brain regions --- what are some of the mental functions that correspond to brain regions?  what can we say about humor? religious experience?  self-control?  decision making?
  • imaging the brain --- what techniques are now available to tell what is going on in the brain?  what advances have been made since the days of phrenology?
  • development --- how does the brain change as humans grow up?  how does this reflect changes in psychology?

The interview with Churchland (a prominent contemporary philosopher of mind) explores physicalism and its implications.  Topics of discussion include: causal objections to dualism, the significance of mind-brain correlation, meaning and morality, and the role of the environment.  (Churchland is an ardent physicalist, and she is sometimes dismissive of dualism.  What are her reasons?  How might a dualist reasonably respond?)

The BBC documentary "Brain Story" pursues the idea that  that the brain "maps" the mind in various ways.  It shows how a range of specific psychological problems arise from disruptions in specific parts of the brain.  Examples include open brain surgery, phantom limb syndrome, amusia, degeneration of the substantia nigra, frontal lobe damage, and epilepsy.

  • awake brain surgery --- why is brain surgery conducted while the patient is awake?  in this case, what part of the brain are surgeons attempting to leave undamaged?  how do they test this?
  • phantom limb syndrome --- what is this syndrome, and what causes it?   what does this show about how we represent our own bodies?
  • damage to the temporal lobe --- how is the related to epilepsy? creativity? religious experience?
4.2 The Cognitive Mind
Thursday Oct. 23
Read: "The Robot Challenge" and "Reverse-Engineering the Pscyhe"  (from How the Mind Works), Pinker (1997)
Read: "Desert Ants Are Better Than Most High School Students at Trigonometry", Goldman (2012)
  • Note! The Pinker chapter has some hand-written notes and cross-outs from whoever scanned it first.  You can ignore these
Reading Guide
Together, these two readings will introduce you to the idea of cognition as a kind of problem solving, and to the computational theory of mind, which is the topic of Unit 2.   

The first half of the chapter by Pinker walks you through the challenges involved in designing a thinking robot.  This will give you a concrete sense of the kind of problems which cognitive scientists think the human brain solves.  The second half of the chapter  describes the key commitments of the computational theory of mind, and begins to talk about how it is related to the brain.

  • the robot challenge --- what is "the robot challenge"?  what is the relationship between designing a robot and discovering the structure of the mind?
  • problems of vision & action --- what kind of design problems are faced in designing a robot for that can see and act?  how does the brain actually solve these problems?
  • computational theory of mind --- what is the computational theory of mind?  what is the role of information?  does this mean the mind is literally a computer?
  • function of the brain --- what is the function of the brain?  what set of problems is it designed to solve?

The second short article provides a window into the minds of insects, in particular, the navigational abilities of ants.  This is another vivid example of cognition as problem solving.

  • ant navigation --- how do ants navigate home?  what are some possible hypotheses?
  • evidence --- how do scientist's know what computations ants use to navigate?  what are some experiments?
  • step counters --- why do ants count their steps? how do scientists know this?
5.1 Mind as Machine
​Tuesday Oct. 28
Read:
Reading guide
These readings introduce the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM), the idea that the brain is a kind of biological computer which gives rise to the mind.   CTM is contemporary form of physicalism, and it is the motivating idea behind contemporary cognitive science.   The first reading, from Pinker, describes the idea in intuitively vivid terms and gives you a sense of its historical context. 

  • information processing --- how does Pinker use the concept of information processing, when he describes the computational theory of mind?  what are some supposed examples?
  • natural computation --- what does Pinker mean by "natural" computation?  how should this be contrasted with artificial intelligence?
  • mental representation --- what are mental representations, for Pinker?  what are some examples?  what function do they serve?

The second article, by Ravenscroft, provides more of a cut-and-dry statement of CTM, including a formal definition of computation.   Note on terminology:  "syntax" refers to the shape of a symbol or a sentence, "semantics" refers to its meaning.  Consider the sentence (A): cats are not green.  Facts about syntax of (A) include: it has four words, each word contains 3-5 letters, there are 2 "a"s and 3 "e"s, and so on.  Facts about the semantics of (A) include: it's a sentence about a kind of animal, it implies that cats are not dark green or light green, it leaves open the question of whether cats are red, and so on.
​
  • syntax/semantics -- what is this distinction in Ravenscfroft?  what is an example of a syntactic property? a semantic property?
  • computation -- how does Ravenscroft define computation?  how does his example apply, say, to a calculator?
  • computational theory of mind --- what is the definition of CTM?  according to CTM, what is thought?
  • symbols ---  what is the role of symbols in the definition of computation and CTM?
5.2 The Problem of Meaning
Thursday Oct. 30
Read:  "Can computers think?" Searle (1983)
For class: If you haven't already tried an AI chat bot, please do so before class.  I recommend Anthropic's Claude AI.
Reading guide
In the article for today, Searle presents what has become a famous objection to computationalism.   He argues that computationalism fails, but not because computers lack any specific trait like creativity or emotion.  Instead, he uses a thought experiment, called "The Chinese Room" to argue that simply manipulating symbols could never give those symbols meaning.  He concludes that a purely computational theory of mind will never explain how our thoughts mean anything or how we understand language.  (As you'll see, Searle is a physicalist, even though he is anti-computationalist.  But dualists might want to use the same argument to support dualism.)

Terminology:  "syntax" refers to the shape of a symbol or a sentence, "semantics" refers to its meaning.  Consider the sentence (A): cats are not green.  Facts about syntax of (A) include: it has four words, each word contains 3-5 letters, there are 2 "a"s and 3 "e"s, and so on.  Facts about the semantics of (A) include: it's a sentence about a kind of animal, it implies that cats are not dark green or light green, it leaves open the question of whether cats are red, and so on.

  • The Chinese Room -- what is the set-up of the thought experiment?  what is the person inside the room doing?  what is this supposed to show?
  • syntax and semantics --  what is "syntax" and "semantics" in this context?  what does the argument show about syntax and semantics?
  • meaning and understanding -- what is the role of "meaning" and "understanding" in the debate over the Chinese Room example?
  • replies-- what are some possible replies to the argument?  how does Searle respond?
6.1 The Emergent Mind (Systems Reply)
Tuesday Nov. 4
Read: Compiled Readings on Systems Reply
  • "The Cognitive Approach" Braisby and Gellatly (2012)
  • "Marr's Levels of Explanation and Cognitive Psychology" Quinland and Dyson (2008)
  • "Responding to the Chinese Room Argument" Bermudez (2014)
Reading guide
This set of readings deals with issues relevant to the "Systems Reply" to the Chinese Room Argument.    The first reading (Braisby and Gellatly) reviews the key commitments of CTM, and elaborates on the idea of mental meaning (what the authors call "aboutness" or "content").   

The second reading (Quinland and Dyson) describes a classic view in cognitive science about the relationship between different kinds of science.  According to Marr's theory of levels, a complex information processing system, must be described at three distinct levels of abstraction, starting from low-level biology and leading up to high-level cognitive descriptions.

The third reading (Bermudez) returns us to the scene of the Chinese Room, and discusses two objections to it; in class we will focus on the Systems Reply.  This is the idea that, even if the person inside doesn't understand Chinese, the whole room (including the file cards and the person inside) does.   

  • Aboutness -- from Braisby and Gellatly: what is the property of "aboutness"?  What is the content of a mental state?​
  • Marr's Levels ---  from Quinland and Dyson: what are Marr's three levels?   For a human brain, what would be the computational level? algorithmic level?  hardware implementation level?
  • Eliminativism --- how does Marr's approach contrast with Eliminative Materialism?  Is Marr's theory a form of physicalism?
  • System's Reply --- from Bermudez: what is the Systems Reply?  what factors support it?  how would Searle reply?
  • Connections --- can you draw connections between these articles?  How might we use Marr's theory to support the Systems Reply?

Recommended: Oppenheim and Putnam "Th Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis"
6.2 The Embodied Mind (Robot Reply)
Thursday Nov. 6
Read: "Searle and the Robot Reply", Anderson (2006)
Read: "​Information-theoretic semantics", Dretske (2009)
Reading guide
The first reading, by Anderson, examines the Robot Reply to the Chinese Room Argument.  This the position that, if the Chinese Room were suitably positioned within an embodied robot, than it would after all understand Chinese and have genuine mental  representations.   The article relates this reply to the broader philosophical idea of externalism, the idea that the content of our thoughts depends in part on the way we interact with the environment.

  • Robot reply --- What is the Robot Reply?  What part of Searle's argument does it take issue with?
  • Externalism --- What kind view is externalism?  How is it defined?
  • Percpetion and action --- What is the role of visual perception and action in these theories?   How is visual meaning grounded?

The second reading, by Dretske, introduces information semantics.  This is a developed version of externalism.   It holds that meaning is derived from informational relations between states in the brain and states in the external world.

  • Meaning --- what is the difference between natural and non-natural meaning?
  • Information -- what is meant by "information"?  Is information always true?
  • From information to meaning --- how does information become meaning?  what special circumstances must be in place?
7.1 NO CLASS: Veterans day holiday
Tuesday Nov. 11
7.2 ESSAY EXAM #2 (IN-CLASS): Computational theory of mind
Thursday Nov. 13

Unit 3: Consciousness

8.1 What is Consciousness?
Tuesday Nov. 18
Read: "Introducing Consciousness", Papineau and Selina (2001) -- pages 3-22
Read: "Facing up to the problem of consciousness", Chalmers (2010) -- Sections 1-3
Reading guide
​These two readings introduce the problem of consciousness, the subject of our last unit.   "Consciousness" is sometimes called "conscious experience" or "phenomenal consciousness."  ("Phenomenal" means "having to do with appearances.") It is distinguished from mere "awareness" which has to do with processing information from the environment.  The first article by Papineau and Selina introduces the key concepts.  The second article by Chalmers refines this description and distinguishes the easy problem of consciousness from the hard problem.

  • conscious experience --- how would you describe this?  what are examples?  are dreams conscious?
  • subjectivity vs objectivity --- P+S distinguish "subjective feelings" from "objective features" of mental states; what are some examples?
  • functional abilities --- Chalmers contrasts consciousness with various functional abilities?  what are some examples? what's the difference?
  • the easy problem and the hard problem --- what are these two problems? why is one easy and the other hard?
 8.2 The Explanatory Gap
Thursday Nov. 20
Read: "What is it like to be a bat?", Nagel (1974) --- skip the last section, as marked
Reading guide
This article is profound and historically important, but also quite difficult.  There is a lot going on.  For our purposes, there are three main points to watch for: (1) The idea that consciousness is "what it's like" to be something. (2) The idea that, in some sense, we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat. And (3), the idea that consciousness is inherently subjective, while scientific explanations are inherently objective.
  • consciousness as "what it's like" --- what does Nagel mean by this phrase? by this standard, what things count as conscious and what things don't?  what evidence does Nagel provide here?
  • bats --- why does Nagel bring up the case of bats?  what does he think we can and cannot say about them? what is the intended analogy with Martians? what point is illustrated by the example of the bat?
  • subjective and objective --- what does Nagel mean by a "subjective" description as opposed to an "objective" description?  in what sense is consciousness subjective? in what sense are most scientific explanations objective? what does this mean for the possibility of a science of consciousness?
9.1 The Knowledge Argument
Tuesday Nov. 25
Read: "Epiphenomenal qualia", Jackson (1982) -- one page excerpt.
Read: "The Knowledge Argument" and "Subjectivity", Fesser (2005)
Optional: "Knowledge Argument", Alter (2014)
Reading guide
The short excerpt from a paper by Jackson introduces the "Knowledge Argument", which is one of the best known arguments for Dualism.  The two sections from Fesser discuss the argument in more detail.  The Knowledge Argument relies on the claim that there is an explanatory gap, and uses this claim in the context of a thought experiment to argue for Dualism.   As you read, focus on the Knowledge Argument itself, and its relation to Nagel's ideas about subjectivity and objectivity.  Fesser also describes a number of somewhat technical objections to the argument.  Try to understand these as best you can; most importantly, keep track of what is part of the argument itself, and what is merely a response to the argument.
​
  • the "Knowledge Argument"--- what exactly is the argument here?  It relies on a thought experiment-- what is the thought experiment?  What does the argument claim to prove, and how?
  • objections --- what objections are presented against the Knowledge Argument?  does Fesser agree with these objections?
  • subjectivity --- Fesser contrasts subjectivity with "ineffability".  What does he mean?  What is the connection between subjectivity and the Knowledge Argument?
9.2 NO CLASS: Thanksgiving holiday
Thursday Nov. 27
10.1 Dualism vs. Physicalism, Redux
Tuesday Dec. 2
Read:  "Naturalistic Dualism", Chalmers (2010) 
Read: "Epiphenomenalism", Revonsuo (2010)​
Reading guide
These two articles introduce and discuss a new form dualism, which we'll call "naturalistic dualism" in class.     The first article, by Chalmers describes the key commitments of naturalistic dualism from positive perspective.  Naturalistic dualism is (more or less) a form of "epiphephenomenalism," the view that the (conscious) mind has no causal effect on behavior. The second article by Ravonsuo describes epiphenomenalism from a critical perspective. 
​
  • naturalistic dualism --- why is naturalistic dualism a form of dualism?  what about it is naturalistic?
  • fundamental entities and laws --- in Chalmers' naturalistic dualism what are the fundamental features of the universe? what are the fundamental laws? what is the role of psychophysical principles?
  • epiphenomenalism --- what is epiphenomenalism?  what does it say about downward causation?  what about upward causation?
  • pro and con ---  what are the main reasons for believing naturalistic dualism (or epiphenomenalism)?  what are the main reasons for rejecting it?
10.2 Science and Subjectivity
Thursday Dec. 4
Read: "Type-A Materialism" and "Type-B Materialism", Chalmers (2003) -- focus on Type-B
Read: "Critique of the Knowledge Argument", Horgan (1984) (from "Jackson... ")

Required: Survey on Mind-Body Relations
Required: Phil 7 Online Evaluation
Required: UCLA course evaluation for lecture and section​
        [+1% on final grade; access through MyUCLA]
ESSAY EXAM #3 (FINAL EXAM): Consciousness
Wednesday, Dec. 10, 8:00 AM - 11:00 AM
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